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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH BRUNYER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah 
corporation, and DANIEL No. 14267 
NEIL IPSON, 
Defendants, Appellants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EMIL ZIGICH, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a case arising out of an automobile accident 
resulting in a death and personal injuries. Plaintiff, Ralph 
Brunyer, brought the action against defendant, Salt Lake County 
and Daniel Neil Ipson, for his personal injuries and the wrongful 
death of his wife, Louise Brunyer. Defendants and third-party 
plaintiffs, appellants in this appeal, filed a third-party complaint 
asking for contribution against the driver of the vehicle in which 
the plaintiff Brunyer and his wife were riding at the time of the 
accident, the respondent in this case, Emil Zigich. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
As a responsive pleading to the third-party complaint for 
contribution filed by the appellants, respondent Zigich filed a 
motion to dismiss (R.74-75), upon the grounds that appellants had 
no cause of action in contribution under the law applicable to this 
case. 
The matter was orally argued and memoranda of points and 
authorities were submitted by each party (R.107-117) (R.76-92). 
On September 16, 1975, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft granted 
respondent's motion to dismiss, finding that the appellants' claim 
for contribution under the relatively recent adoption of comparative 
negligence by the Utah State Legislature did not apply to this case 
in that the accident for which the appellants seek contribution 
occurred before the effective date of the Comparative Negligence Act. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial Court's order of 
dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The automobile accident that gave rise to the instant 
lawsuit occurred on April 14, 1973, at Gregson Avenue and Main Street 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Respondent Zigich was driving the plaintiff, 
Ralph Brunyer, and his wife Louise home after an evening at the 
Zigich residence. Mr. and Mrs. Brunyer did not compensate Mr. Zigich 
for his ride and were otherwise in the status of guests as to 
respondent Zigich. 
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The appellants1 third-party complaint attempts to circum-
vent the "Guest Statute" on the basis that the respondent was 
intoxicated. Whether or not respondent was intoxicated or guilty 
of willful misconduct so as to lose the protection of the "Guest 
Statute" has not been determined, and only bears on the issues of 
this appeal in determining whether or not the appellants and res-
pondent are joint tort-feasors for purposes of comparing their 
negligence as discussed in Point IV of this brief. 
The chronology of events as set forth in appellants1 
Statement of Facts is substantially correct with the exception that 
the Brunyers and the respondent Zigich had been attending a party. 
In fact, the Brunyers were guests in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Zigich 
and other than the Brunyers and the Zigichs, there was no one else 
present. (See deposition of Emil Zigich, page 17.) Respondent 
disagrees with the appellants1 characterization in his Statement of 
Facts of the "Utah Contribution Statute" inasmuch as contribution 
among joint tort-feasors is not a separate statute nor an act in and 
of itself, but part of and interdependent with the Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act, House Bill No. 25, codified in Section 78-27-37 et 
seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS1 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND HOLDING THAT UTAH'S COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE ACT DID NOT APPLY TO THE ACTION BEFORE THE 
COURT INASMUCH AS THE ACCIDENT WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE 
PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE 
OF THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT AND THE COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE ACT IS NOT RETROACTIVE. 
-3-
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The automobile accident from which the present litigation 
arises occurred on April 14, 1973. This was twenty-five (25) days 
prior to the effective date of the relatively recently adopted Utah 
Comparative Negligence Act. The effective date was May 8, 1973. 
It is the respondent's position that the rights and lia-
bilities of all parties to the accident of April 14, 1973, were 
fixed as of the time of the accident. Utah law at the time of the 
accident, which is the subject of appellants1 claim for contribution, 
did not allow contribution between joint tort-feasors and the later 
passage of the Comparative Negligence Act does not retroactively 
create a right which was non-existent at the time of the accident. 
It is only with the passage of Section 4 of the Comparative 
Negligence Act, that contribution is now allowed between joint 
tort-feasors. 
The state of the law in Utah prior to the effective date 
of the Comparative Negligence Act and the law that applied on 
April 14, 1973, the date of the plaintiff's injuries, is adamantly 
clear; there was no right of contribution between joint tort-feasors. 
This Court in the case of Hardman v. Matthews, 1 Utah 2d 110, 262 
P2d 748 (1953) held that a defendant tort-feasor had no right to 
implead under Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the host 
driver of the plaintiff as a party defendant. In Hardman, there 
was an auto collision where a plaintiff guest passenger sued the 
driver of the second automobile involved in the accident, claiming 
negligence; the defendant claimed that he had a right to join the 
-4-
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host driver of the plaintiff as a defendant under Rule 14. The 
trial court allowed the defendant to join the host driver and on an 
intermediate appeal, this Court instructed the trial court to vacate 
its order which allowed the joinder. In so doing, this Court said: 
If the negligence of the interpleaded 
parties were the sole proximate cause of 
the injuries as defendants maintain, the 
latter would have a complete defense to 
the action without the joinder. If actively 
they were jointly or concurrently negligent 
with defendants, joinder would avail the 
latter nothing since contribution cannot 
be had between joint or concurring tort-
feasors, in a cTase like this, unless sanc-
tioned by statute, there being none such 
in Utah. (Emphasis added.) 
Only after the accident for which the appellants seek con-
tribution, did the Legislature sanction by statute, within the 
Comparative Negligence Act, contribution between joint tort-feasors; 
prior to its effective date no right existed. 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 68-3-3 (1953) entitled nRevised 
Statutes not Retroactive" states: MNo part of these revised statutes 
is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." The Compilers Notes 
in explaining the construction and application of this statute state: 
"This section is merely a statement of well-settled rules of 
statutory construction." They cite the leading Utah case of Farrel v. 
Pingree, 5 Utah 443, 16 Pac. 843. This case involved the amending 
of an act relating to the terms of County Treasurers where the words 
"two years" were substituted for the words "four years". At the time 
of the Act's passage, the treasurer in office had served nearly two 
-5-
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years and a new treasurer had been elected to fill the vacancy. 
The court held that the amended act could not cut short the in-
cumbent's term from four to two years. 
The argument of the plaintiff in the Farrel case that the 
amendment should relate back to the date of the incumbent's 
election is similar to the appellants1 argument in the case at 
bar that the comparative negligence statute should act to allow 
contribution to an accident occurring prior to the Act's effective 
date. The Utah Supreme Court's refusal to allow such a construction 
in Farrel was proper, and the opinion became influential in the 
adoption of 68-3-3 cited supra. The court stated: 
There is no authority or sound reason 
for holding that such amendment took 
effect as of August, 1884, nearly two 
years prior to its enactment. The def-
endant contends that although the statute 
took effect on the day of its passage, 
yet that it related back to the August 
of 1884, the date of Harris' election. 
We are at a loss to know why this is so. 
The amendment says nothing whatsoever 
about the enactment relating back two 
years, or any other time, prior to its 
passage, and we see nothing in the amend-
ment upon which to hang an inference of 
that nature. We are not justified add-
ing to a statute something that the 
legislature never intended, or had in 
contemplation in enacting the statute. ... 
The statute, with the interpretation 
sought to be placed upon it by the def-
endant, would be clearly retroactive. 
No court will hold a statute to be retro-
active when the legislature has not said 
so, and there is no reason why it should 
be so, and where the statute is easily , 
susceptible of another and reasonable 
construction. The general rule, as 
-6-
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found in the books, is even stronger 
than we have stated. It is laid down 
in Broom's Legal Maxims that flaws 
should be construed as prospective, and 
not retrospective, unless they are 
expressly made applicable to past 
transactions, and to such as are still 
pending.f ... 
It being clear, therefore, that the 
legislative intent that the amendment 
should be retrospective, does not appear, 
it is settled by an overwhelming weight 
of authority that the enactment of the 
11th of March, 1886, had no retrospective 
or retroactive effect, but its operation 
is entirely prospective. (Emphasis added.) 
Since the Comparative Negligence Act was not expressly made 
applicable to past actions and as to those causes of action that were 
still pending at the time of its passage, it should only be applied 
prospectively. 
In Okland Construction Company v. The Industrial Commission, 
520 P2d 208 (1974) the Utah Court again had occasion in a workman's 
compensation setting to state the general rule as to statutory 
application. 
It is true, as the employer Okland •'•"• 
contends: that it is entitled to have 
its rights determined on the basis of 
the law as it existed at the time of 
the occurrence; and that a later statute 
or amendment should not be applied in a 
retroactive manner to deprive a party 
of his rights or impose greater liability 
upon him.2 ... (footnote 2) This long 
established rule is enacted in our 
statutes, Sec. 68-3-3, U.C.A. 1953; 
In any event, we revert to consideration 
of the problem under the statute as it 
existed at the time of the accident, and 
without concern as to the later amendment. 
The statutory adoption of the rule of comparative negligence 
by an increasing number of states in recent years, to replace the 
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common law rule of contributory negligence, has given rise to the 
question whether the statutes adopting such a rule are to be applied 
retroactively to accidents which occurred prior to the effective 
date of the statute, so as to allow recovery by a plaintiff who was 
otherwise barred under the rule of contributory negligence. The 
respondent would respectfully direct the Court's attention to 
57 A.L.R. 3d 1458 and its treatment of this issue entitled "Retro-
spective Application of State Statute Substituting Rule of Comparative 
Negligence for that of Contributory Negligence." The conclusive 
observation of the writer of the annotation is as follows: 
In accordance with the strict rule of 
construction generally against giving 
retrospective operation to a statute where 
the intention of the legislature is not 
c
 stated in express terms, the courts, al-
though not usually alluding to such rule, 
have refused retrospective application to 
a comparative negligence statute which 
was silent to the legislative intent in 
the matter. 
In all the jurisdictions cited in the annotation, only one 
court allowed retroactive application of the comparative negligence 
statutes and that was because the statute expressly provided for such 
an application, stating that the act would apply to any action in 
which the trial was commenced after a specified date. 
The majority of the courts, including Wisconsin* from which 
the Utah statute was largely derived, have held that the Comparative 
Negligence Acts will not be applied retroactively to accidents which 
occurred prior to the effective date of the Act, even if the trial 
-8-
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is after the Act is in effect. Utah's Comparative Negligence Act 
was taken almost verbatim from the Idaho Act adopted by that State 
in 1971. Idaho Code, Sec. 6-801 (Supp. 1973). The Idaho Comparative 
Negligence Act's ancestry can be traced directly to the original 
Wisconsin statute, which is found in Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, 
Sec. 895.045 (1966), and the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-
Feasor's Act. It is noteworthy that the Wisconsin courts have held 
that the Comparative Negligence Act was not to be applied retro-
actively. It is also significant in the case of Wisconsin to note 
that it has been the leading proponent of comparative negligence for 
the last 42 years. 
In Wisconsin, the Comparative Negligence Act was first held 
not to be applied retroactively in 1933. In the case of Brewster v. 
Ludtke, 211 Wis. 344, 247 N.W. 449 (1933), the Court denied the 
plaintiff recovery for the death of a pedestrian alleged to have 
been caused by the negligence of the driver of an automobile when it 
stated: 
(The decedent)...was therefore as a 
matter of law guilty of negligence that 
contributed to her death. This consti-
tutes a complete defense, as the collision 
occurred before the enactment of the 
Comparative Negligence Statute. 
Subsequent to the Brewster decision, supra, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held in Crane v. Webber, 211 Wis. 294, 247 N.W. 882 
(1933), that where the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
in an auto-train collision occurring Mbefore the enactment of the 
-9-
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legislature of the comparative negligence statute" that contributory 
negligence is an absolute defense to the action. As recently as 
1972, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Halzem v. Mueller, 54 Wis. 
388, 195 N.W. 2d 635 (1972) held that no modification or amendment to 
the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence Statute was to be applied retro-
actively. 
Since the adoption of comparative negligence in Wisconsin, 
numerous states in addition to Utah, have adopted a similar, if not 
identical statute, and the majority of those courts in the states 
where the statute was adopted have held that comparative negligence 
will not be applied retroactively. The Colorado Supreme Court in 
Heafer v. Denver-Boulder Bus Line, 489 P2d 315 (1971) held that the 
comparative negligence statute in Colorado shall apply only to actions 
arising out of events which occur on or after July 1, 1971, the date 
specified in the statute as becoming effective. The policy argument 
given by the court for so doing was: "Judicial restraint requires 
that we honor the prospective application of the statute in the 
interest of avoiding unwarranted confusion in pending litigation 
involving tort transaction occurring prior to the adoption of the 
statute." 
The Hawaiian Court in Bissen v. Fujii, 466 P2d 429 (Hawaii 
1970), and in Silva v. Oishi, 471 P2d 524 (Hawaii 1970) rejected the 
contention that the comparative negligence standard should have been 
applied in these cases where plaintiffs were injured in automobile 
accidents, holding that since the comparative negligence statute 
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applied on ] y to c] ai us accrui ng after J t took effect, and since 
p ] a :i 111 i £ f:f s c 1 a i in. s a :: c i i i e d b e 1: o i e s i i c 1 I e f £ e c 1: :i e < i a t e , s i i c h c J! a i in s 
were not governed by the comparative negligence i tile. In Bis sen, 
tl le I lawa i :i ai l Coi irt: expressed the same pol i cy as the Colorado Coui t. 
The statute is effective for tort 
claims which accrued after July 14, 
. • 1969, and to adopt the doctrine of 
comparative negligence for this case 
(prior accident) would create unneces-
sary and unwarranted confusion in the 
law. We should use judicial restraint 
and not leave any implication that we 
are trying to 'outdo1 the legislature. 
, • 1 he 0r egoi I Supi eme Coi ir I: he] d :i i i. Josep'l I v JLowei y , 19 5 P2 <i 1 ,"! 7 /> , 
(Or. 1972) a n d i n B r u c e v . S y l v e s t e r , 497 P2d 1 1 5 2 for- 1 9 7 2 ) , tl lal 
1:1 Ie r ecen t ] egi s 1 at:i i? e ac 1: wi I i c 1 i .adop 1:ed 1:he ] aw of coinparative neg 1 i -
gence was not to be app l i ed r e t r o a c t i veJ y, and despi t e tl le fact tl la t 
the t r i a l s of botl i of tl lese automobi le a cc iden t cases were he ld 
aftei tl I = effecti \ e d a t e o f t*( le i ie\ r ] a i ; „ i It: i JB s 1 i e ] < i tl I E • t i :i a ] coi irt 
e r r e d in app 1 ying t.he 1 aw o£ comparati v e neg 1 i gence to 11 Ie acc i den t s 
which occurred prior to the effective date of the new law. In Joseph, 
V H S s t«i t e d : . ' • . . - •• '.. 
Therefore, if applied retroactively, 
the act would affect legal rights and 
obligations arising out of past actions. 
'•••;: ; '• ••. As a result:, strictly for the purposes 
under consideration here, the provisions 
of the act are 'substantive* and not 
'procedural or remedial1 in nature. If 
applied retroactively, the statute 
could create a duty to pay which did 
• not exist at the time the damage was 
inflicted. 
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In addition to the Oregon, Colorado, and Hawaiian courts 
of our jurisdiction, many other courts have held their comparative 
negligence acts not to be retroactive. 
The Maine Court in Moore v. Fenton, 289 A2d 698, (Maine 
1972), involving an automobile truck collision occurring prior to 
the effective date of their comparative negligence act held: 
This case, in which trial was held 
on December 28, 1970, was tried by the 
parties in the posture that it was gov-
erned by the common law doctrine that 
any contributory negligence of plaintiff 
would bar his recovery (rather than the 
statutory modification establishing 
comparative causational negligence) 
because regardless of the time of the • v* . 
trial, the events generating the alleged 
cause of action had occurred prior to 
the statute, ... We treat the case 
therefore, as controlled by the common 
law of contributory negligence. 
The Mississippi Court in Fuller v, Illinois Central R.R. Co., 
100 Miss. 705, 56 So. 783 (1911) held that the newly established 
comparative negligence doctrine would be inapplicable to a personal 
injury sustained prior to the passage of the act. See also Jones v. 
Jones, 311 A2d 522 (N.H. 1973) 
In all of the above cited cases where an accident had 
occurred prior to the effective date of the Comparative Negligence Act 
and the trial of those cases came after the effective date of the 
Act, the courts refused to give the Act a retroactive construction. 
The date of the accident was held to be controlling, such a statutory 
construction being the only one consistent with preventing unwarranted 
and unnecessary confusion in the law. 
»12-
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• POINT II ' • 
THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT AFFECTS SUBSTAN-
TIVE LAW AND THEREFORE, IF APPLIED RETROACTIVELY, 
' THE ACT WOULD AFFECT LEGAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
ARISING OUT OF PAST ACTIONS AND CREATE A DUTY TO 
CONTRIBUTE TO A JOINT TORT-FEASOR WHICH DID NOT 
•' ' EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT IN QUESTION. 
.'' •.' <: • • ' ' T h e a p p e ] 1 a n t s a r g i i e i i i I " o i i 1 !:  1 1 c • i: 1:1 I e :i i b i :i e I: f I I o w e v e :i : 
even,, i £ it were assumed that some retroactive application must occur 
tc the date o 6 the accident, such app] ication is permiss i b 1 e s 1 n c e no 
s u b s t: a n I: :i v e c 1 i a n g e s 1 I a v e o c c u i r e d b > t h e passage o £ t h i s a c t ' ! 1 I e • • 
respondent submits that the. Comparative Negligence Act does very 
m a 1: e r i a 1 11 y e f fe c 1: f f s i; xb s 1: ai I 1: :i t ef""' ] aw ai id s i n c e 1:1 I er e wa s ' - • 
c o n t r i b u t i o n a v a i 1 a b 1 e a t t h e 1: i m e t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d, o i I e cannot 
be created at a later date by the adoption of a statute allowing 
cc i l ti :i bi iti on. . . • '. . • . • . . • • : 
The general rule of construction concerning the i nterpreta-
ti on of statutes as i t: h a s b e e n a p p 3 1 e d b> 1:he I Jtah S \ i p r e m e Coi 11 t :i s 
t h a t a n a c t a £ £ e c 11 n g s ub s t a n 11 ve r I g h t s w i ] 1 n o t b e g I ve i i r e 11 o a c 11 v e 
effect unless the act clearly requires :i I: i'lie Comparative Negligence 
A c I: i s s :i ] e n t a s t: o w 1 i e 1: h e i o i i i o I: i t s h o i i ] d b e a p p ] i e d i e 11 o a : 1: :i  \ i e .1! ;  
Representati vre of the Utah Supreme Court f s application of the 
principle is In re Ingraham fs Estate, 1,06 I Jtah 337, ] 48 I '2d 3 10 (1 9- 1 4), 
w h e i e t h i s C o i i r t h e 1 d t h a t a ,J 9 4 3 ] a w a p p 1 > i i I g I: o e s f: a t: e s w a s i I o f: 
retroactive and In so doing stated: • 
That this court is committed to the 
general rule can not be questioned, for 
in the case of Merc,ur Gold Mining § 
Milling Co. v. Spry, County Collector, 16 
Utah 222, 52 P. 382, 284, Judge Miner said: 
- V 3 
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'Constitutions, as well as statutes, 
should operate prospectively only, un-
less the words employed show a clear 
intention that they should have a retro-
active effect. This rule of construction 
should always be adhered to, unless there 
be something on the face of the statute 
putting it beyond doubt that the legis-
lature meant it to operate retrospec-
tively. Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 73; 
Suth. St. Const. , §§ 463-465.f 
We are convinced that the general rule 
must apply as Sec. 80-12-7, Laws of Utah 1943, 
is not a procedural enactment; but is substan-
tive in its effect. 
* & * 
Had the legislature intended Sec. 80-12-7, 
Laws of Utah 1943, to have a retroactive effect, 
it is reasonable to suppose they would have 
made such a declaration in the amendment. 
* * * 
We are forced to the conclusion that the in-
tention of the legislature is doubtful and that 
Judge Miner's pronouncement of the law, above 
"'" mentioned, is applicable to the situation before 
us. 
* * * 
In addition to this court's pronouncements in In re 
Ingraham's Estate, supra., the Utah Code speaks to the question and 
provides some direction with respect to construction of Utah State 
statutes. In Section 68-3-3, U.C.A. 1953 as amended it states: 
68-3-3 Revised statutes not retroactive.--
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared. 
This court's pronouncement on whether or not substantive law 
will be given retroactive or prospective application appears 
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adamantly clear, and if tl ie Comparati ve Negligence Act. i s sub-
s na 1: i u e, , i t s h o u ] d i i o t b e app 1 i e d re tr o a c t i ve ] y. 
In determining whether or not the Comparati v e Negligence 
Act affects substantive law, thi s Coi irt has spoken :i n the case of 
Petty v. Clark, 113 1 Itah. 205, 192 P2d 5 • , Ii l tl i. i t c:< \ s -e, 
the Court i n de £ in i n g s ub s t an t ive 1aw stat e d: 
Substantive law is defined as the 
positive law which creates, defines and 
regulates the rights and duties of the 
parties and which may give rise to a 
cause of action, as distinctive from 
adjective law which pertains to and pre-
scribes the practice and procedure or 
the legal machinery by which the sub-
stantive law is determined or made 
. effective. 
From the above definition, tl ie respondent .asserts that the 
e 1 ements o£ the Comparat:i ve Neg 1 igence Act, inc] ud i ng that portion of 
11 i e Act whic h pe r t a i n s to cont ribut i on am on g.j oi nt t ort - £e a so r s 
dramatically effects the substantive law lal d down I n Hardman v. 
Matthews , supra. Ihe ( ompa ra f J ve Negligence A* t material h affects 
the impact of contributory negligence in contribution between joint 
tort-feasors as if existed prior to the effective date oi the Act, 
The LoJiipaiM I, no* Negligence Ac I hirMn. » letlefines and regulali1 llir 
rights and responsibjII ties of tort-teasers and allows n cause of 
acti on lor contribution between joint tort-feasois wlieie none existed 
under prior law of contributory negligence. 
In an article in the Utah Law Review, Vol. 1973, Fa] 1 No. 3, 
bv Professor Wayne Tftodc at page 43'1 if states: .• . \ 
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VI. Effective Date of Comparative 
Negligence Act. 
A general rule of construction applied 
by the Utah Supreme Court is that an 
act affecting substantive rights will 
not be given retroactive effect unless 
the act clearly commands that this be 
done. The Comparative Negligence Act, 
affecting the substantive law of contri-
butory negligence and contribution 
between joint tort-feasors, contains 
no provision for retroactive application. 
The Act applies, therefore, only to 
claims that arose 60 or more days after 
March 8, 1973, the date of adjournment 
of the 1973 Legislature. (Emphasis added.) 
The statutory interpretation of what constitutes substantive 
law as applied by the Utah Courts is in accord with general statements 
of the law as set forth in 18 Am Jur 2d, Contribution, Sec. 45 p.65: 
. . .the right of a joint tortfeasor to 
contribution from his cotortfeasors is 
a matter of substantive law which, in 
diversity suits, is controlled by state, 
and not federal, law. 
Further, in 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, Sec. 350, p. 487, the 
work discusses general rules of statutory interpretation with regard 
to prospective or retrospective application as follows: 
The question of whether a statute 
operates retrospectively, or prospec-
tively only, is one of legislative 
intent. In determining such intent, 
courts observe a strict rule of construc-
tion against a retrospective operation, 
and indulge in the presumption that 
the legislature intended statutes, or 
amendments thereof, enacted by it, to 
operate prospectively only, and not 
retroactively. However, a contrary 
determination will be made where the 
intention of the legislature to make 
a statute retroactive is stated in 
express terms, or is clearly, explicitly, 
positively, unequivocally, unmistakably, 
-16-
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and unambiguously shown by necessary 
implication or by terms which permit 
no other meaning to be annexed to 
them, and which preclude all question 
in regard thereto, and leave no reason-
able doubt thereof. 
It is especially true that a statute 
or amendment will be regarded as oper-
ating prospectively only, where it is 
in derogation of a common law right, or 
where the effect of giving it a retro-
active operation would be to interfere 
with an existing contract, destroy a 
vested right, or create a new liability 
Tn connection with a past transaction, 
invalidate a defense which was good when 
the statute wa~passed, or in general, 
render the statute or amendment uncon-
stitutional. (Emphasis added.) 
Since there was no ri ght to conti :i bu t:i 01 1 betwe ei 1 jc :i i 1 1: toi I: • 
feasors in tit ih as of the time of the accident as noted in Hardman v. 
Matthew,' , i up i a fn \ I I mi t h< appelJ ants to obtai n contribution from. 
the respondent and retroactively apply tl le Comparative Negligence Act 
would be to create a new liability ii i connects on with the past 
f i ansae I* i on ami won! I invalidate a iJolVnsc as .tiiiony i o 1111 inrt fVa • i s 
regarding joinder and impleader which was good before the sta tute was • 
passed, ^ • ' . ' • 
Inasmuch as tl le Comparative Negligence Act affects substan I::it \i e 
law both in comparing, negligence of joint tort -'feasors as to a 
p I rim f I IT and IM I I li n ^ a r d I <> conf r i.buti on between j oint tort feasors , 
and since the act contains no express provision 01 even an implied 
intent that it should be applied retroactively, the Act should be 
applied prospective] y. ' . • ••'•.- y ' . y 
1 7 •• 
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The case of Joseph v. Lowery, 495 P2d 273 (Ore. 1972) is 
illustrative of the above principles. In the Joseph case, the 
Supreme Court of Oregon held that dispite the fact that the trial 
of an automobile accident case was held after the effective date of 
the new Comparative Negligence Law, the trial court erred in applying 
the law of comparative negligence to the accident which occurred 
prior to the effective date of the law. The Oregon statute, like 
Utah's, was mainly derived from Wisconsin's statute and was silent 
as to the time of its application. The Oregon Court held that the 
statute was substantive and refused to give it retroactive effect 
since it would thereby affect the legal rights and obligations 
arising out of past actions. The Court stated: 
There is no provision in the statute 
which either requires or prohibits its 
retroactive application. However, 
statutes other than those which are 
procedural or remedial in nature are 
applied prospectively in the absence 
of direction to the contrary. ... 
Under the comparative negligence statute, 
a plaintiff whose negligence is less 
than that of the defendant is not 
barred from recovery by virtue of his 
contributory negligence, but is allowed 
recovery reduced by the degree of his 
fault. Therefore, if applied retro-
actively, the act would effect legal 
rights and obligations arising out of 
past actions. As a result, strictly for 
the purposes under consideration here, 
the provisions of the act are 'sub-
stantive1 and not 'procedural or rem-
edial' in nature. If applied retroactively, 
the statute would create a duty to pay 
which did not exist at the time the 
damage was inflicted. 
-18-
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.' "• •.• In the Joseph case, the plaint 1 ff, i i i a similar.fash ion to 
fully that: the doctri lie of vested ri ght had no appl ication to a =. •
 : 
c h a n g e i n 1 a w g o v e r n ii n g a c a i i s e o f a c t :i o n b a s e d u p o n c o m m o n 3 a w 
r e t r o a c t i v e a p p 1 i c a t i o n i n v o 1 v e d i I o t: o n 2 y p r e j u d i c i a 11 > a f f e c t i n g 
v e s t e d r :i g h 1: s , I: • i i I: a 1! s :: I: I I e • II = • g a 111 c h a r a c t e i ::) I: f • a s 1: I: r a n s a c t il o n s • ' , 
The Court stated: r 
'•"' - .' While all ...vested rights may be 
considered substantive for present • • 
purposes, it does not necessarily 
•: ' fall that tl le only subject matter 
that is considered substantive is 
that which relates to vested rights. 
Our decisions are clear that statutes 
which have not affected, vested rights 
have been denied retroactive appli-
cation. Whether vested rights are 
'.'• .; .. affected is not the sole criterian 
used in Oregon in determining if a 
particular statute is to be g:i ven 
retroactive application 
..•/.'./";.. • - E v e i i :i II: :i I: i i e •! e t::i : i i = •. a s 1:1 ic: appe] 1 a i i its a s se i t,, itl la 1: 1:1 le - ' . 
respondent cannot c 1 aim t h a t t h e r e was a tim.e 11 Iat a r i g 1 It: to be 
free from liabi lity 1 lad vested, then the statute still ma ;) i lot be 
of past transactions are prejudiced. • : . '•••...' 
Final 1 y, the Oregon Si lpreme Coin I i n .Iosej>h_v^ I iOjwei ) , supra , 
vo. 1 ced poli c> arguments as to t) e party's expectations of liabili ty 
which appear to be parti cular] > i elevai it in tl le case now before the 
Court Tl i"e • C >" / i ! i > I: ,< ite< I : .. .. .'..•.-• • . • •. •'- ' . • • ••;::: ' ' •  -.• ' : 
-1 9 -
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Certainly, no one has an accident 
upon the faith of the then existing 
law. However, it would come as a shock 
to someone who has estimated his pro-
bable liability arising from a past } 
accident, and who has planned his 
affairs accordingly, to find that his 1 
responsibility, therefore, is not to 
be determined as of the happening of 
the accident, but is also dependent 
upon what the legislature might sub-
sequently do. Every day it is neces-
/;••-..• V ••'•-:-:-^  y.^ ' sary in the conduct of the affairs of 
individuals and of businesses to make 
a closely calculated estimate of the 
responsibility or lack thereof result-
ing from an accident or from other 
unforeseen or unplanned circumstances 
and to act in reliance upon such 
estimate. We believe there is merit 
in the prior view of this court, as 
demonstrated by its decisions, that, 
in the absence of an indication to the 
contrary, legislative acts should not 
be construed in a manner which changes 
legal rights and responsibilities 
arising out of transactions which 
occur prior to the passage of such acts. 
The third-party plaintiff relies heavily upon the case of 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company v. Industrial Commission, 2 Utah 2d 
1, 268 P2d 689 (1954), as analogous to the present case. The Silver 
King case has no application to the present action for a number of 
reasons. 
Silver King involved a claim for the death of a workman 
and the question of whether or not the cause of action for his death 
asserted by his heirs under workman's compensation arose under an 
earlier two years statute or a statute which was in effect at the 
time of his death providing for five years. Under the workman's 
-20-
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c o in p e n s a t :i o n s I: a 1:1 11 e s , i 11 I i c 1 i w e i e :i i I e f f e c t w h e n t: h e d e c e a s e d left 
h i s emp 1 oymen t, i £ dea 1:1 I o c cur r e d £r om s 1.1 i co s i s w 11 h in two years 
a c 1 a :i m w o \ 11 d b e ho n o r e d b y t h e I n d u s t r :i a 1 C omm i s s I o n. P r i o i t o 
t h i s d e a 11 i o i: t: 1 I e e m p ] o y e e , 1:1 I e 1: :i in. e p e i I o d w a s e x t e n d e d t o • E ii v e . . ' 
years , The employee died from silicosis at a ti me whei I tl le fi ve -.' 
y e a r ] i in :i t a t :i o n w a s :i n e f £ e c 1:. I h i s C o u i t 1 i e 1 d t: h a t t h e cause o £ : 
action arose at the death of tl le employee and as the fi v e y ear '•' 
statute was in effect at the time of hi s death, when the cause of 
action a rose. tl lat O we yeai 1 in i:i ta ti oi i app] i ed. . - • • • , ; 
The employer argued that the employ ee fs cause o£ acti o n -.•..:•' 
under the workman f s compensation provisions came Into existence at 
t h e 11 in e t h e e in p 1 o y e e ] e f t 1 I i s e in p ] o > m e i I I: 'I ' 1 I i s C o i 11 f: i e j e c t: e d 11 i a !: 
argument and held that the cause of acti on for death arose when the 
death occi IT red . • •• . •: 
Ii I the present situation, appellan ts 1 claim, for conti i buti on, 
comes into effect, if there i s such a i i gl it, at: the time of the 
a c c i d e n 1: w h :i c h p r o d i i c e s p 1 a i n !:: i f ff s c 1 a i in a g a 11 i s t 1 I i in !:li s I: h e r e . •' . • • 
was no r1ght of contribution when the 1nstant accIdent occuri ed, the 
ap p e 1 1 an t s h a v e n o c ] a 1 in b e c a us e c o n t r 1 b u t i o n d i d n o t e x i s 1: wl i e n • • 
11 I e i i c a i i s e o f a c 1: i o i I w o i i ] < 1 1 I a i ; e I: o a r i s e, T1 i i s C o i 11 t i J :> i i .1! d 1 i a \ € • 
t: o ap p 1 y t h e C o mp a r a 11 v e Neglige n c e A c t i e t r o a c 11 v e 1 y t o c r e a t e a 
cause oi action wheiu x i o u . „\> >t\ ^ ^ n u x L U inc ^ L . "1 he principal •• 
di fe^n<~^ between Silver King .i. , ^e ^resent situation is wl len tl le 
cause , : ... i: H, ...^J^. L, **»• ,.-:•<; . , ,, u » ;use o(* action, 
I I " • - ' ' * ' I C fi f L Oil) |' * : •. 
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negligence and in Silver King the cause of action arose after the 
statute was effective. 
Appellants also cite the case of Augustus v. Bean, 14 
Cal.Rptr. 641, 363 P2d 873 (1961) in support of their position 
that they are entitled to contribution even though the accident, 
which is the subject of this litigation, occurred prior to the 
effective date of Utah's Comparative Negligence Act, A review of the 
decision in Augustus v. Bean will show that both the parties seeking 
contribution and the party from whom contribution was sought, were 
named as co-defendants by the plaintiff Augustus in the principal 
action. That set of facts is totally different than the facts in 
the instant litigation where the plaintiff Brunyer has not named as 
a defendant the respondent Zigich. Additionally, the California 
Court was construing a statute which is substantially different 
than Utah's Comparative Negligence Statute. Section 875 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, which the California Court construes, states that 
contribution lies where a money judgment has been rendered jointly 
against two or more defendants in a tort action and one of them has 
paid more than his prorata share of that judgment. In the present 
litigation, as the plaintiff has elected not to name Zigich as a co-
defendant, which was his right under the Utah law effective at the 
time of the accident, there can be no judgment rendered jointly in 
this case against both appellants and respondent. 
California Court, in holding as it did, stated that their 
cbnstruction of Section 8 75 of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
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did not give rise to a problem of retroactive impairment of a vested 
right inasmuch as at the time of the accident, prior to adoption of 
Section 875, a person did not have a vested right at common law to 
avoid paying for the consequences of his negligence. That statement 
by the California Court is true if a party seeking contribution and 
the party from whom contribution is sought are both defendants in 
the principal action. Where the respondent Zigich has not been 
named as a defendant and as the statute of limitations for at least 
a portion of BrunyerVs principal lawsuit, to wit: the wrongful 
death claim has run as against this defendant, requiring this res-
pondent to contribute to a judgment which represents damages for 
wrongful death where no action could be maintained under any circum-
stances against the plaintiff regardless of the guest statute because 
the statute of limitations has run. 
POINT III 
THE SECTIONS OF THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT, 
WHICH ALLOW CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN JOINT TORT-
FEASORS DOES NOT CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
CONTRIBUTION, BUT RATHER RIPENS AN INCHOATE 
RIGHT FOR CONTRIBUTION IF, AND ONLY IF, THE LAW 
WHICH APPLIES AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT PROVIDES 
FOR CONTRIBUTION. 
Appellants argue that the cause of action for contribution 
arises when he has been sued by the plaintiff. As the appellants 
were sued by the plaintiff after the effective date of the Comparative 
Negligence Act, the appellants contend that this Court would not be 
retroactively applying the Comparative Negligence Act were it to 
-23-
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allow contribution in this instance. Even under comparative 
negligence, a cause of action for contribution, which one tort-
feasor may have against another, arises at the time of the accident. 
Prior to the effective date of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, 
there was no contribution, and accordingly, no right can exist , 
even at a later time. The right of contribution, if one exists, 
is created at the time of the accident and vests when one tort-
feasor by judgment pays more than his prorata share thereof. Had 
this accident occurred after the effective date of the Comparative 
Negligence Act, then the appellants1 right for contribution and 
cause of action therefor would have been an inchoate right from the 
date of the accident until such time as he paid more than his 
prorata share of a judgment to the plaintiff. The payment of more 
than a prorata share is the instrumentality which vests the inchoate 
right. 
In 18 Am Jur 2d, Contribution, Sec. 45, p. 65, the 
author discusses, "Prerequisites to, and Accrual of, Right to 
Recover Contribution." "If, in accordance with the principles \ 
discussed above a right to recover contribution is available as 
among joint tort-feasors, the prerequisites to the accrual of that 
right and of the corresponding obligation to contribute are the 
same, generally speaking, as in contribution cases generally." 
This section of Am Jur goes on to discuss inchoate rights. 
The discussion in this section is predicated upon the basis that, 
"If ... a right to recover contribution is available as among 
-24-
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joint tort-feasors...", then certain inchoate rights to contribution 
arise at the time of the accident which ripen into an enforceable 
claim after judgment and payment of more than the prorata share by 
one joint tort-feasor. But in the case at bar, the accident 
occurred prior to the Comparative Negligence Act and as such, there 
was no available right to recover contribution among joint tort-
feasors and a right that never exists, can, of course, never vest. 
18 Am Jur 2d, Contribution, Sec. 47, p. 66, states: 
It is important to note, however, the 
distinction between the accrual of the 
right to recover contribution and the 
inchoate right to contribution before 
payment or discharge of the common lia-
bility. Even though a cause of action 
for contribution does not become complete 
until the claimant's act of payment or 
discharge of more than his equitable 
share of the common liability, generally 
a right to be protected against an 
unfair exaction--an incidental or inchoate 
right to compel contribution-comes into 
being and becomes the property right or 
interest of a tort-feasor the instant 
the joint or concurring acts of him?e"lf 
and other tort feasors give to the injured 
person a cause of action against them--
in other words, when the common liability 
arises. Such right is in a sense an 
incident which follows the principal 
event out of which the injured person's 
cause of action arises, and once in 
being, although contingent, subordinate, 
or inchoate, it is nonetheless real 
and subsisting, and has an existence 
in contemplation of law until it is no 
longer needed as a resource to which 
the joint tort feasor may look for relief 
from an imposition upon him of an in-
equitable share of the burden on account 
of the joint tort, provided he does 
not in the meantime waive or give up 
such right. This inchoate right arises 
-25-
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as soon as the acts of the joint 
wrongdoers raise the injured person's 
cause of action against them, it doe"? 
not depend upon an action against 
them being commenced. (Emphasis added.) 
This section of Am Jur points out that a right to contri-
bution comes into existence at the time of the accident and that 
if an inchoate right for contribution is created at the time of 
the accident, should the law allow contribution at the time of 
the accident, then the inchoate right vests when a tort-feasor 
pays more than his prorata share. Accordingly, applied to the 
facts of this case, appellants did not even have an inchoate right 
to enforce against the respondent. 
Appellants suggest to this Court that the trial court erred 
in catagorization in the order of dismissal with regard to the 
"Comparative Negligence ActM (p. 7 Appellants1 Brief) and suggests 
that the right of contribution between joint tort-feasors is a 
separate, distinct and unrelated statute. The changing of Utah!s 
prior law to comparative negligence from common law principles of 
contributory negligence was contained in House Bill No. 25 
entitled Utah Comparative Negligence Act. The Act was codified into 
the Utah Code from Section 78-27-37 to 78-27-43. A copy of that 
bill as passed by the Legislature is attached to this brief as 
Appendix I. 
In reviewing the bill as passed, it will be noted that 
contribution between joint tort-feasors is contained in the 
"Comparative Negligence Act" as section 4. Contribution is an 
integral part of comparative negligence and cannot be severed and 
called the "Utah Contribution Statute" in an attempt to convince 
-26- .v.. 
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this Court that retroactive application of contribution would not be 
retroactive application of the principles of comparative negligence 
itself. Contribution between joint tort-feasors, except in special 
circumstances not applicable here, did not exist prior to the in-
ception of comparative negligence and contribution cannot exist 
without it. The appellants' statement that the trial court improperly 
characterized the provisions dealing with contribution as the 
"Comparative Negligence Act" is incorrect. 
POINT IV 
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE APPELLANTS 
HAVE A RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION IN THIS INSTANCE 
WHERE THE ACCIDENT GOVERNING THE RIGHTS OF THE 
PARTIES OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE 
OF THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT, THE APPELLANTS 
•> AND RESPONDENT ARE NOT JOINT TORT-FEASORS FOR 
THE PURPOSES OF CONTRIBUTION IN THAT THEIR LIA-
vBILITY IS NOT COMMON. 
•The depositions which are exhibits to the record in this 
matter and the record on appeal show that the plaintiff, Ralph Brunyer, 
and his wife, Louise Brunyer, were guest passengers in the automobile 
operated by respondent, Emil Zigich. 
It is clear that in Utah, a guest passenger in an automobile 
may not sue, nor may a guest passenger have any recovery, from his 
host driver in the absence of intoxication or willful misconduct on 
the part of the host driver. There is no recovery by a guest 
passenger against a host driver for ordinary or simple negligence. 
The standard of care that the Legislature, by adopting the Utah 
Guest Statute, as found in Section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended, is substantially less than the standard of care required 
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of third persons who are responsible to a guest for simple or 
ordinary negligence, Utah's Comparative Negligence Act only allows 
contribution between joint tort-feasors and notes that their lia-
bility must be common. The applicable section reads: 
78-27-39. Contribution among joint 
tort-feasors--Discharge of common lia-
bility by joint tort-feasor required.--
(1) The right of contribution shall 
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a 
joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled 
to a money judgment for contribution 
until he has, by payment, discharged 
the common liability or more than his 
prorata share thereof. (Emphasis added.) 
The complaint that has been filed by Ralph Brunyer on behalf 
of himself and for the wrongful death of his wife against Salt Lake 
County and Daniel Ipson is based upon ordinary or simple negligence, 
whereas, any claim that can be made by the plaintiff against the 
respondent Zigich, his host driver, must be based upon intoxication 
or willful misconduct. Needless to say, intoxication or willful 
misconduct is substantially beyond simple or ordinary negligence. 
This Court has clearly set forth the nature of the conduct that must 
be attributable to a host driver before a guest passenger may recover 
from him. This Court has ruled that the conduct required is beyond 
gross negligence and by the terms of the statute itself indicates 
that the conduct must be of a willful or intentional nature. In the 
case of Milligan v. Harward, 11 U2d 74, 355 P2d 62 (1960), this 
Court noted that "willful misconduct" must be an intentional act. 
...Wilful misconduct is the inten-
tional doing of an act or intentional 
omitting or failing to do an act, with 
knowledge that serious injury is a 
probable and not merely a possible 
result, or the intentional doing of an 
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act with wanton and reckless dis-
regard of the possible consequences. 
Wilful misconduct cannot be pre-
dicated upon mere inadvertence or 
even gross negligence. 
Because of the differences in the nature and character of 
the activities required of a host driver or a third party, the 
respondent and appellants respectively in this case, there is no 
common liability between them. The activities of the host driver 
fall into the catagory of an intentional tort where the activities 
of a third party, the appellants in this case, are in the catagory 
of an unintentional tort or simple negligence. Because of this 
difference, their activities cannot be compared and contribution 
will not lie. A finder of fact can only compare, under Utah's 
Comparative Negligence Act, the negligent activities of the joint 
tort-feasors. Intoxication, or willful misconduct and simple 
negligence cannot be compared. 
The appellants in their memorandum of points and authorities 
in opposition to the respondent's motion to dismiss at the trial 
court level suggests to the trial court that it interpret common 
liability to mean whether or not the plaintiff may have a legally 
recognized remedy against both the party seeking contribution and 
the party for whom contribution is sought. The respondent submits 
that the question of common liability in comparing the activities 
of two alleged joint tort-feasors is much more complex than merely 
determining whether or not a plaintiff might have a cause of action 
regardless of its nature against multiple defendants. The nature 
and type of the acts and the theories of recovery must be considered 
in determining whether or not common liability is present. 
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Equal availability of recovery against possible def-
endants does not create common liability. The nature of the act 
*•'•' of the potential defendants as to the plaintiff must be similar, 
at least the activities of the potential defendants as to the 
plaintiff must fall into the catagory of negligence, not one in the 
catagory of intentional tort and the other in the catagory of 
negligence, before common liability can exist. To compare 
negligence of two tort-feasors, both tort-feasors must be 
negligent. The standard of conduct that is required of them as 
to the plaintiff must be the same. 
POINT V 
APPELLANTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION FROM 
RESPONDENT AS TO THOSE PORTIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMS AGAINST APPELLANTS FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF 
LOUISE BRUNYER IN THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH HAS RUN AS TO THE RESPONDENT. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the guest statute is not a 
bar to an action by the plaintiff against the respondent for the 
wrongful death of Louise Brunyer, a claim for wrongful death must 
be brought within two years from the date of death. 
78-12-28. Within two years.--
Within two years: 
* fi it 
(2) An action to recover 
damages for the death of one 
caused by the wrongful att or 
neglect of another. 
Any claim that the plaintiff, Ralph Brunyer, may have for 
the wrongful death of his wife, Louise Brunyer, is barred as to 
the respondent Zigich by the statute of limitations, regardless of 
whether the respondent was negligent, intoxicated or guilty of willful 
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As respondent can have no liability to the plaintiff 
for the wrongful death allegations of his complaint, because of the 
statute of limitations, the appellants cannot circumvent the lack 
of liability between respondent and the plaintiff by a third-party 
complaint for contribution due to the statute of limitations. 
As the respondent has no liability to the plaintiff, 
there can be no common liability between the appellants and the 
respondent as to the wrongful death allegations of the plaintiff's 
complaint. 
The situation where a statute of limitations has run 
is analogous to the issue where a defendant and third-party 
plaintiff attempts to circumvent the guest statute under the 
guise of contribution and comparative negligence. In situations 
involving the guest statute, the Courts considering the issue have 
uniformly held that any defenses that a third-party defendant may 
have against the plaintiff work as a defense to contribution 
and what the plaintiff cannot do directly, the third-party 
plaintiff cannot do indirectly. 
The cases concerning attempts to circumvent a defense 
such as the guest statute are collected in 26 A.L.R. 3d 1283. 
As with the guest statute defense, the Courts, in cases of 
workman's compensation, where a defendant has attempted to bring 
in as a third-party defendant for the purposes of contribution an 
employer or fellow servant where that employer's or fellow servant's 
liability has been discharged under workman's compensation laws, 
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have uniformly held that no right of contribution exists. 
Representative of those workman's compensation cases is Beal v. 
Southern Union Gas Co., 62 N.M. 38, 304 P2d 566 (1956), Where 
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a proposed third-party 
defendant employer had no obligation to contribute to a 
defendant who was sued by an employee for negligence, in that 
workman's compensation was not only a bar to the employee but also 
a bar to a third-party seeking contribution against the employer 
as a result of a suit between the employee and the third person. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that appellants' third-party complaint 
was properly dismissed in that the Comparative Negligence Act in 
materially affecting substantive law should not be retroactively 
applied to this case in that the accident which established the 
rights and responsibilities, or the lack of them, occurred prior 
to the effective date of the Act. The appellants' claim for 
contribution being an integral part of comparative negligence 
should not be given retroactive effect which would occur in that 
appellants had no right to contribution when the rights and 
liabilities of the parties were established. Finally, the 
appellants and respondent are not joint tort-feasors with common 
liability because plaintiff has no claim against this respondent 
due to the statute of limitations for wrongful death and there 
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is no common liability because of the difference in degree of the 
/ 
acts that appellants are attempting/to compare. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
• / S f t 
/ TIMOTHY R 
HA/SON, WADSWORTH O*US£0N 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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DELIVERED two copies of the foregoihg Respondent's 
Brief on Appeal to counsel for Appellants/this 2 3rd day of 
February, 1976. 
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I, CLYDE L. MILLER, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT the attached Engrossed copy of House Bill #25, 
(UTAH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT) is a true and correct copy of the 
original bill passed by the 1973 Utah State Legislature and signed 
by Governor Calvin L. Rampton on March 19, 1973. 
AS APPEARS of record IN MY OFFICE. 
• ' - ' > ' ' / / ) J 
IN W I T N E S S W H E R E O F , 1 HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HAND 
AND AFFIXED THE GREAT SEAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
17 t h
 D A y OF AT SALT LAKE CITY. THIS 
February 
19 . 76 
/ 
'-•^f^J/r '?^7.i^L'7 
/U\ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
BY /*T>^--r.-r -r^-c^-r :>\ y / - ^ / * 
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1973 
(UTAH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 
Engrossed Copy 
H.B. No. 25 By C. DeMont Judd, Jr\ 
AM ACT RELATING TO ACTIONS FOR THE RECOVERY OF DAMAGES IN ACTIONS BASED ON 
NEGLIGENCE OR GROSS NEGLIGENCE; REMOVING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS 
A BAR TO ANY RECOVERY UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; PROVIDING FOR THE 
. DIMINISHING OF ANY RECOVERY IN PROPORTION TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE 
PERSON SEEKING RECOVERY; PROVIDING FOR SEPARATE JUDGMENTS AS TO 
• DAMAGES AND PROPORTIONATE NEGLIGENCE; PROVIDING FOR CONTRIBUTION AMONG 
JOINT TORTFEASORS; PROVIDING FOR THE RELEASE OF ONE OR MORE JOINT 
TORTFEASORS WITHOUT RELEASING THEM ALL; AND PROVIDING FOR THE EFFECT 
OF SUCH RELEASES ON OTHER JOINT TORTFEASORS. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an 
action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for 
negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in injury to person 
or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence or gross 
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages 
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the person recovering. As used in this act, "contributory 
negligence" includes "assumption of the risk11. 
Section 2. The court may, and when requested by any party shall, 
direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining (1) the total 
amount of damages suffered and (2) the percentage of negligence attributable 
to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount of the damages in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person seeking 
recovery. 
Section 3. (1) The right of contribution shall exist among joint 
tortfeasors, but a joint tortfeasor shall not be entitled to a money 
judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged the common 
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Engrossed Copy 
H.B. No. 25 
liability or more than his pro rata share thereof. 
Section 4. (1) A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with 
the injured person shall not be entitled to recover contribution from another 
joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished 
by that settlement. 
(.2) When there is a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors 
to an extent that it would render inequitable an equal distribution by 
contribution among them of their common liability, the relative degrees 
of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their 
pro rata shares, solely for the purpose of determining their rights of 
contribution among themselves, each remaining severally liable to the 
injured person for the whole injury as at common law. 
(3) As used in this section, "joint tortfeasor" means one of tv/o or 
more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to 
person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all 
or some of them. 
Section 5. Nothing in this act shall affect: 
(1) The common law liability of the several joint tortfeasors to 
have judgment recovered, and payment made, from them individually by the 
injured person for the whole injury. However, the recovery of a judgment by 
the injured person against one joint tortfeasor does not discharge the other 
joint tortfeasors. 
(2) Any right of indemnity which may exist under present law, 
(3) Any right to contribution or indemnity arising from contract 
or agreement. 
Section 6. A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, 
whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors, 
unless the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other 
tortfeasors by the greater of: (1) The amount of the consideration paid 
for that release; or (2) the amount or proportion by which the release 
provides that the total claim shall be reduced. 
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Engrossed Copy 
H.B. No. 25 '.; 
Section 7. (1) A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor 
does not relieve him From liability to make contribution to another joint 
tortfeasor unless that release: 
(a) Is given before the right of the other tortfeasor to secure a _ . 
money judgment for contribution has accrued; and 
(b) Provides for a reduction* to the extent of the pro rata shzra 
of the released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable 
against all the other tortfeasors. . .,.-,; 
(2) This section shall apply only if the issue of proportionate fault 
is litigated betv/een joint tortfeasors in the same action. 
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